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We examine the effect of trade protection rates on evasion in three African countries Kenya, 
Mauritius and Nigeria.  In capturing the effect of trade protection on tariff evasion, we use a 
much improved measure of trade protection from MacMAP 2001 and 2004. For two of 
these  countries,  the  MacMAP  dataset  allows  the  novelty  of  using  variation  in  trade 
protection across product, time and trading partners leading to significantly refined estimates 
of evasion elasticity relative to existing studies on tariff evasion. We find a robust evidence 
for positive elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs in Kenya and Nigeria with relatively 
weaker evidence for Mauritius. Our results match the rankings of countries in institutional 
quality (in terms of the Corruption Perception Index). Greater responsiveness of evasion to 
the level of tariffs is established in Nigeria (comparatively weak institutional quality) vis-à-vis 
Kenya,  and  in  Kenya  vis-à-vis  Mauritius  (comparatively  good  institutional  quality).  This 
pattern is preserved even when focusing on same set of trading partners and same set of 
imported products for the three countries. This result is robust to controlling for protection 
on related products (that creates incentives/ opportunities for evasion) and also for degree 
of differentiation of the product and some other characteristics that could determine the 
ease of detection of evasion).  
 
JEL Classifications:  F13; H26; K42 
 




Trade protection and tax evasion: Evidence from Kenya, Mauritius and 
Nigeria 
 
“The new tariff has low rate of duty that would encourage payment of duty and discourage smuggling activities’’- 
Customs Comptroller-General of  Nigeria, Alhaji  Hamman-Bello Ahmed  on  the new tariff regime introduced  in 
Nigeria (Vanguard, News Report, October 2008).  
1.  Introduction 
The  effect  of  trade  protection  on  tax  evasion  is  of  considerable  policy  interest  in  low  income 
countries as an overwhelming share of total government revenues comprises tariff revenues. Between 2001 
and 2003, the trade tax revenues comprised 22% of total government revenues in low income countries 
while in the OECD countries it was just 1% (Fukasaku, 2003). For Kenya and Mauritius respectively, in 
2005, the share of taxes on international trade in central government revenues was 11% and 20% (World 
Development Indicators, 2007). This figure is lower for Nigeria and estimated to be around 5-6% (OECD 
2008).1  
Even  though  the  shares  of  tariff  revenue  have  gone  down  over  time  in  these  countries,  they 
continue to be significant in government’s budget.2 Thus, fear of a loss of a major source of revenue is 
widely perceived to be a deterrent to trade liberalization (see for example Ng’eno et al 2003). In Nigeria also 
even though contribution of tariffs to government revenue is smaller, fears of a loss of tariff revenue have 
been prominent in discussions relating to trade liberalization and also to participation in several regional 
arrangements such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and in Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Europe.3 
However, if the level of trade protection is positively correlated with evasion, then the expectation of loss of 
trade revenue need not be valid. Further, the level of trade itself could rise with lowering of tariffs and also 
loss in revenue collection could be made up through increases in collection efficiency (See Aizenman and 
Jinjarak 2005).4     
The effect of the level of tax rate on tax evasion has been highly contentious in the literature owing 
to the theoretical ambiguity about the direction of the impact as well as the problems of measurement of 
evasion.  In a pioneering work, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) showed that the sign of the elasticity of tax 
                                                           
1 In Nigeria oil contributes very significantly to revenues (some estimates put it nearly 80%). This is mainly in the form of 
production and export taxes. However even in oil tax revenues there have been reports of corruption (see the recent work by 
Nigerian  Extractive  Industries  Transparency  Initiative  (NEITI)  that  looked  at  payments  from  the  oil  companies  to  the 
government between 1999 and 2004). On the import side dependence on import tax revenues could be lower but the same forces 
that would lead to evasion in import taxes could apply to evasion in export/production taxes. The evasion in production or 
export taxes we do not address in this paper. Yet to the extent that import tax evasion establishes the level of institutional quality 
in Nigeria this is likely to have a bearing also on evasion in other taxes most importantly in case of Nigeria in the oil sector.  
2 In Kenya the average share of trade taxes in government revenues between 1999-2001 was 14.59%. It came down to 8.98% for 
2002-2005. The corresponding numbers for Mauritius are 27.14 and 20.13 percent respectively. In Nigeria, the latest budget for 
2009 envisages to raise the share of trade taxes in government revenue and reduce the dependence on oil taxes mainly in light of 
the falling oil prices.    
3 See for example Zouhon-Bi and Nielsen (2007) for potential impact of EPA on Nigeria’s revenue (estimated to be around 1% of 
GDP).  
4 It could also be made up by increase in collection from other sources such as Value Added taxes (VAT).  
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evasion with respect to tax rates is ambiguous, depending on taxpayers’ risk aversion and the punishment 
for evasion. Though the theoretical ambiguity remains for tax rates’ relationship with evasion, Bhagwati 
(1964)  suggested  that  the  discrepancies  between  a  country’  s  reported  imports  and  the  corresponding 
exports reported by its trading partners may be explained by the undervaluation or misclassification of 
imports at the border in order to reduce the tariff burden. More recently, Fisman and Wei (2004) argued 
that trade flows in fact offer a good opportunity to analyze the relationship between tax rate and evasion 
with the measurement of evasion suggested by Bhagwati (1964) and quantify this effect for trade between 
mainland China and Hong Kong. Following these authors, several studies have explored the correlation 
between trade taxes and evasion using the reporting gap between exporting and importing country agencies. 
These include Levin and Widell (2007) for Kenya and Tanzania, Mishra et al (2008) for India, Javorcik and 
Narciso (2008) for East European countries and Dunem and Arndt (2006) for Mozambique.  
In this paper, we study the tariff evasion for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria. We employ a much 
improved trade protection data (MacMAP 2001 and 2004) relative to the existing studies on tariff evasion. 
This dataset provides extended measures of protection. The MAcMAP (2001 and 2004) database on trade 
protection includes ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of specific tariffs, AVE of tariff rate quotas and AVE of 
anti dumping duties apart from ad valorem tariffs. Further, the dataset also captures country specific trade 
protection by accounting for all regional agreements and preferential schemes. Hence, the analysis captures 
evasion with respect to a more comprehensive set of trade protection variables relative to the existing 
measures (that focus mostly on ad valorem tariffs or Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs.5 The choice of the 
three African countries is dictated by the fact that at least two of them are highly dependent on tariffs as a 
source of revenue and that their institutional qualities appear different according to international rankings 
such as the one from Transparency International.  
In relation to the now established literature on relationship between tariff rates and evasion, this 
paper makes the following contributions. First, the paper implements a rigorous analysis of this relationship 
for countries in the most protectionist continent, i.e. Africa, selecting three countries that differ in their 
perceived institutional quality. As the discussion in the paper would show there exist some studies on Africa 
but most of them are based on extremely small sample and/or have employed very simple methodologies.   
Second and more importantly, the paper uses a dataset that can account for potentially important  
errors in measures of protection. These errors emanate from narrow focus on ad valorem tariffs. Neglecting 
other measures like specific tariffs and tariff rate quotas is far from trivial and for the three countries the 
measured cross-elasticity of evasion varies with the breadth of the measure of protection. Though like in 
three previous studies, i.e. Fisman and Wei (2004), Mishra et al (2008) and Javorcik and Narciso (2008), we 
are also unable to account for quantitative barriers but there is partial accounting for it in our dataset 
through tariff rate quotas. 
Third, since evasion is postulated to be a function of level of applied tariffs, the variation in tariffs by 
trading partners implies that incentives to evade vary across exporters. The construction of the MacMAP 
dataset allows us to account for this with applied tariffs varying across trading partners. Variation across 
trading partners is particularly important owing to the role of some unobserved factors determining evasion. 
For example, the customs enforcement is likely to vary depending upon the origin of imports. Reputation 
effects imply that custom officials are more circumspect when the same product is shipped from particular 
countries. Also the mode of shipment could differ across trading partners affecting the ease of evasion. 
Another trading partner characteristic that could be extremely important for determining evasion is the 
                                                           
5 Though not the central focus of this paper, we find that the breadth of the measure of protection is important as estimated 
evasion elasticity varies with it.  
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system of pre-shipment inspection (Anson et al (2006)).
6 Additionally, evidence for the exporter country 
characteristics to be important comes from differences in match between export and import country data. 
In the cases studied here as well as in Mishra et al (2008) match rates tend to go up with developed country 
exporters i.e. with countries that presumably have better institutional quality.  
Controlling for product, time and trading partner fixed effects implies that our estimates are likely to 
be quite refined. In effect, we exploit variation across three dimensions, across product (as in Fisman and 
Wei 2004, Levin and Widell (2007) and Dunem and Arndt (2006)), across time (product and time variation 
hence as in Mishra et al (2008) and Javorcik and Narciso (2008) and across trading partners.  
Our results indicate that in these three African countries, the evasion elasticity is significant with 
weaker  evidence  in  case  of  Mauritius  (i.e.  in  two  specifications  among  several,  insignificant  effect  is 
obtained). Moreover, the evasion elasticity is much higher in Nigeria, followed by Kenya and then Mauritius.  
The difference between the three cases is preserved when comparing the same set of products and trading 
partners. In this case the evasion elasticity differences are likely to be a function of enforcement quality. This 
relative ordering of the estimated evasion elasticity matches the ordering in different indices of perceived 
institutional  quality  (for  example  as  provided  by  Transparency  International).  While  most  indices  of 
institutional quality are based on perception surveys and are subject to enumerator and respondent bias, the 
estimated evasion elasticity particularly with same partners and in same products could provide an objective 
basis for comparison of institutional quality across countries. The implicit metric for measuring institutional 
quality in this case is the quality of enforcement of customs regulation.     
In our econometric specification, we also account for characteristics that could be correlated with 
enforcement such as degree of product differentiation (which is expected to make evasion more likely). 
Even after accounting for degree of product differentiation, the evasion elasticity continues to be higher for 
Nigeria  relative  to  Kenya  and  higher  for  Kenya  relative  to  Mauritius.  The  supportive  evidence  for 
enforcement being the factor determining evasion follows the Mishra et al (2008) and Javorcik and Narciso 
(2008) criteria of ease of detection. The authors argue that evasion is simpler with greater degree of product 
differentiation. .  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three countries in terms of trade policy 
and institutional quality. Section 3 outlines the definition of the evasion measures and the methodology. 
Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics of the variables used in the paper. Section 5 
presents  the  results  of  the  regression  analysis.  Section  6  checks  for  robustness  of some  of  the  results 
obtained earlier. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Trade and institutional characteristics of Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria 
Kenya,  Mauritius  and  Nigeria  are  all  members  of  the  World  Trade  Organization.  The  three 
countries’ tariff profiles are very similar: for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria respectively, only 14.6%, 17.8% 
and 19.2% of tariff lines are bound with simple average bound tariffs equal to 95.7%, 93.7% and 118.3%  
respectively (WTO Tariff profiles 2006). To put the level of tariff protection in these countries in context, 
Table 1 gives estimates of protectionism in the African continent in 2004 with reference to world, other 
continents and income-level groups of countries.7 The African continent is clearly highly protectionist and 
                                                           
6 The empirical results for different countries in Anson et al (2006) are mixed with regard to the effect of PSI on import tariff 
evasion. 
7 Comparisons between averages from WTO’s Tarif Profiles and the MacMAP-HS6 database reveal substantial differences: it 
can be explained by differences of computational methods (simple average vs. reference group’s trade-weighted averages; 
MFN applied duties vs. applied duties and different periods of reference).  
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the three countries studied here are amongst the most protectionist countries with average duty on imports 
at 16.3%, 17.8% and 26.5% respectively. 
   
Table 1: Protection applied on imports in 2004 
 
(Source: MacMAP-HS6 2004) 
Country Global Agriculture Industry Primary
Madagascar 3.7% 4.5% 3.6% 0.1%
Swaziland 5.2% 16.3% 4.6% 0.2%
Namibia 5.2% 16.3% 4.6% 0.2%
Lesotho 5.2% 16.4% 4.6% 0.2%
Eritrea 6.0% 8.3% 5.6% 3.1%
Rwanda 6.8% 11.6% 6.5% 4.8%
South africa 7.0% 16.8% 6.1% 0.6%
Botswana 7.1% 17.9% 6.1% 0.6%
Uganda 7.4% 10.5% 6.3% 13.0%
Côte d ivoire 8.2% 12.6% 8.5% 1.3%
Mayotte 8.3% 7.0% 9.1% 0.5%
Senegal 8.3% 13.0% 8.6% 1.3%
Togo 8.3% 13.0% 8.6% 1.3%
Mauritania 8.7% 10.0% 8.9% 5.1%
Angola 8.8% 9.1% 7.2% 28.6%
Burkina faso 9.5% 11.8% 9.2% 1.8%
Mozambique 9.5% 13.2% 8.9% 3.8%
Niger 9.5% 11.9% 9.2% 1.8%
Mali 9.5% 11.8% 9.2% 1.8%
Benin 9.6% 11.8% 9.2% 1.8%
Guinea bissau 9.7% 11.8% 9.4% 1.8%
Zambia 10.5% 14.1% 9.9% 5.7%
Congo  democratic republ 10.6% 12.1% 10.4% 6.3%
Tanzania  united rep. of 10.7% 18.2% 9.4% 1.6%
Malawi 11.0% 12.5% 10.9% 1.2%
Ethiopia 12.9% 17.8% 12.1% 5.7%
Algeria 13.1% 17.5% 13.2% 7.3%
Gabon 13.8% 20.2% 13.5% 10.0%
Equatorial guinea 13.8% 20.2% 13.5% 10.0%
Zimbabwe 14.3% 23.1% 13.5% 12.9%
Egypt 14.4% 64.7% 10.7% 3.7%
Central african republic 15.0% 23.3% 14.6% 10.0%
Cameroon 15.0% 23.3% 14.6% 10.0%
Chad 15.1% 21.1% 13.9% 10.0%
Congo 15.1% 21.1% 13.9% 10.0%
Kenya 16.3% 29.4% 13.9% 4.2%
Ghana 17.2% 19.6% 18.7% 2.7%
Mauritius 17.8% 24.1% 17.8% 2.3%
Sudan 18.5% 25.8% 17.2% 7.5%
Morocco 19.2% 44.7% 17.3% 13.7%
Tunisia 19.6% 54.8% 17.3% 9.0%
Burundi 20.4% 27.4% 19.1% 13.3%
Libyan arab jamahiriya 21.0% 13.7% 18.3% 60.5%
Nigeria 26.5% 41.8% 23.6% 14.9%
Seychelles 28.6% 44.0% 26.9% 28.0%
Djibouti 30.5% 14.9% 32.1% 32.4%
World 4.4% 15.5% 3.6% 1.5%
Africa 14.3% 27.6% 12.9% 9.9%
Asia - Oceania 6.9% 22.5% 5.8% 2.4%
Europe 2.3% 13.2% 1.5% 0.2%
North America 3.2% 7.9% 2.9% 1.7%
South America 8.2% 12.4% 8.1% 3.8%
OECD 2.8% 13.9% 2.0% 0.5%
MIC 8.4% 19.6% 7.7% 3.9%





Our hypothesis is that the elasticity of fiscal evasion depends on the institutional quality of the 
importing country.  The countries selected here follow an ordered ranking in terms of perceived institutional 
quality across different indices.  To rank institutional quality, an index  often used is the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International.
8 The CPI ranks 180 countries by their 
perceived levels of corruption. These perceived levels are determined by expert assessments and opinion 
surveys. Table 2 provides the three countries’ ranks and scores in 2001 and 2004. 
 
Table 2: Corruption Perception Index (2001 and 2004) - Ranking and Score 
  2001  2004 
I.    Country Rank  Country Score  Country Rank  Country Score 
Kenya  84/91  2.0/10  129/145  2.1/10 
Mauritius  40/91  4.5/10  54/145  4.1/10 
Nigeria  90/91  1.0/10  144/145  1.6/10 
(source: Transparency International) 
Amongst African countries, Mauritius is clearly one of the less corrupted countries (as perceived by 
experts, business leaders and external and internal stakeholders). Nigeria on the other hand is frequently 
pointed out as one of the countries in Africa with worst perceived institutional quality and in the world in 
terms of corruption. Compared to Africa, Kenya gets an intermediate rank.
9 
In Kenya and Nigeria in particular corruption in the customs department has been documented 
quite  extensively.  In  March  2008,  the  Kenya  Revenue  Authority  for  example  suspended  183  customs 
clearing agents, including some who were being investigated for tax evasion. News reports indicated that in 
some cases, KRA employees colluded with the agents to falsify the paperwork so as to evade paying tax 
worth millions of shillings (AllAfrica.com, March 5, 2008). Kenya Ethics Department in its 2004 report 
stated  that  there  are  serious  corruption  issues  at  the  Mombasa  port  including  large  scale  incidence  of 
underreporting of imports. In its 2008 report by Transparency International, among the surveyed clients of 
Kenya Port Authority, 58% of the respondents reported encountering a bribery incidence.  
In case of Mauritius even though the perceived institutional quality is among the highest in Africa, 
issues relating to customs corruption have been prominent there. The Mauritian government had actually 
                                                           
8 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. 
9 It is noteworthy that according to the last survey conducted by Transparency International in 2007, scores of Mauritius and 
Nigeria have improved significantly compared to 2004 (4.7 and 2.2 respectively while Kenya’s score has been stable at 2.1). 
Consequently, Nigeria has outranked Kenya in 2007, but the difference in score is not significant. This study focuses on 2001 and 




hired  a  foreigner  to  clean  up  the customs  department  by  bringing  in  more  transparency  and  reducing 
corruption.10 
 
3.  Methodology 
Basic Specification 
We follow Fisman and Wei (2004) and Mishra et al (2008) in defining the measures of evasion. The 
first definition of evasion in value is identical to Fisman and Wei (2004) and is defined as: 
       1    = log            − log (         )             (1) 
Where        1    refers to evasion in value of product   (at the harmonized schedule 6 digit 
level) at time    (2001 and 2004) with trading partner   (all the trading partner countries).              refers 
to the export value reported in year t by the country c from which the good p is exported to Kenya, 
Mauritius or Nigeria, and             is the value of imports reported by Kenyan, Mauritian or Nigerian 
authorities. Note that this measure of evasion, named definition 1, exists only when both imports as well as 
exports at the 6 digit level appear in the data.  However, there exist a sizable number of cases where 
corresponding to the entries in the export data, there does not exist an entry in the import data.  
For these cases we follow the second measure of evasion        2    as in Mishra et al (2008) 
which  is  based  on  the  extreme  assumption  of  complete  smuggling  in  such  cases.  Thus,  if  an  export 
transaction is recorded by the partner country but not by the Kenyan/Mauritian/Nigerian authorities, these 
exports  are  assumed smuggled  into  the  country, and import  value  is  coded as  zero.  Thus,  the  second 
measure of evasion is defined as follows: 
       2    = log 1 +           − log (1 +          ) 
                        (2) 
 
Unlike Mishra et al (2008) we do not find (for the pooled data for 2001 and 2004) that trade 
protection measures for those exports for which there are no corresponding imports are significantly higher 
on  an average  thus  creating  greater incentives  to  evade taxes. In  Nigeria  however  such  an  ordering  is 
observed where the average applied tariff is 33.6% in this case while it is 25.0% otherwise.  For all three 
countries, we employ specifications with the assumption of complete smuggling as test for robustness and 
also to tally with existing measures of evasion as referred to by Fisman and Wei (2004) and implemented by 
                                                           
10 The following quote summarizes the state of affairs in Mauritius regarding customs corruption. “Imagine living in paradise: a 
tropical island, filled with white-sand beaches, coral reefs, turquoise lagoons and palm trees. This is how Bert Cunningham (a 
Canadian national), describes the island of Mauritius, his home since being appointed as the head of Customs and Excise for 
Mauritius in October 2002. But something was rotten in paradise. Cunningham, nicknamed “The Cleaner”, came to Mauritius 
with the dubious task of cleaning up decades of corruption in the area of customs and revenue. His hard work is paying off: 
following three difficult years of cleaning, Cunningham was recently named Mauritian of the Year. The latest report of 
Transparency International has revealed that Mauritius has gone up in the index concerning the perception of corruption. 
Mauritius is now at the 41st place against 53rd in 2007.  
In Mauritius, the report underlines that reforms of the Mauritius Revenue Authority were carried out over the past two years with 
the aim of ensuring greater transparency and integrity in customs, which was previously considered to be one of the three most 




Mishra et al (2008). In cross-sectional estimation on 2001, 2004 and pooled sample data with the measures 
of evasion as defined in equations 1 and 2, our basic specification is: 
  =  1,2               =   ∝ +     ∗             +    ∗               +   ∗   +   *(          ∗  ) +
          
                       (3)
 
 
where the right hand side is specified for both measures of evasion. The main coefficient of interest 
is  : it measures the (semi) elasticity of evasion with respect to           , the tariff imposed by Kenya, 
Mauritius or Nigeria on product p coming from partner c at time t. Following Fisman and Wei (2004), in 
addition to under-reporting of the value of imports, evasion may take the form of misclassification i.e. 
reporting a higher taxed product as a lower tax one. To investigate this type of evasion we add the tariff on 
related products as an additional regressor. The variable               is defined as the tax on related 
products (i.e. the average tariff on other products in the same HS-4 category, weighted by their value of 
exports from their source countries). 
11 
   is the dummy that equals 1 if products are differentiated based on Rauch classification. Degree of 
differentiation is one of the intrinsic characteristics of products that may affect the ease of enforcement. The 
Rauch classification (Rauch, 1999) distinguishes goods by whether they are homogenous goods (whose 
prices are widely known or quoted in exchanges) or differentiated goods (whose prices are less well known 
and determined more by specific transactions). Following Mishra et al (2008) and Javorcik and Narciso 
(2008), the fact that prices are widely known and quoted in exchanges make it easier for compliance as 
under-reporting or misclassification can be more easily spotted from available information. We thus interact 
tariffs with the differentiated dummy to capture the effect of this product characteristic on evasion. 
The counterpart of equation (3) in quantity is specified as: 
"  i=  1,2               =∝ +     ∗Tariff      +    ∗               +    ∗ (          ∗  ) +   ∗
  +           
 
(4) 
where       1   =     (          ) –    (          )  and       2   =     (1 +
          ) –    (1 +           );            and            refer to trade in volume (exports 
and imports respectively). Thus, the equation is specified for both the measures of evasion. For a check of 




Fixed effects estimation  
As discussed above, since trade protection data (for Mauritius and Kenya) based on MacMAP (2001) 
and MacMAP (2004) allows variation over time, products and trading partners, we employ the following  
rich specification.  
               =∝ +     ∗            +      +      +      +    ∗               +      ∗ (          ∗
 ) +∈         
      
                      (5) 
                                                           
11 Note that tariffs weighted by own exports are generally lower than simple averages owing to negative relationship between 
level of tariffs and level of exports.  
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The dependent variable in equation 5 is evasion as described earlier which is measured at product, 
time and trading partner level (to match with the trade protection data). D’s are vectors of product, year and 
trading partner fixed effects. It is important to note that given the fixed effects, our identification will rely 
on within-product (at the 6-digit level) and partner over-time variation and will not be affected by product 
or partner country characteristics. We cluster the standard errors at the 4-digit product level, to account for 
potential serial correlation of evasion for a particular product. A counterpart of equation 5 is also estimated 
for evasion in terms of quantity that is specified in equation (6) below. 
 
          =      ∝ +     ∗            +      +      +      +    ∗               +      ∗ (          ∗  ) +∈         
 
(6) 
The generality of the specification in equations (5) and (6) implies that endogeneity issue is much 
less of a concern for the coefficient on tariffs.  If tariffs at the product and trading partner level were 
changed between 2001 and 2004 taking into account the evasion at the product and partner level then it will 
be a concern. The identification of the coefficient of evasion elasticity relies on within product trading 
partner variation over time. Such a minute basis for policy making is highly unlikely. Hence, the richness of 
the specification makes the possibility of bias in coefficients to be minimal leading to very refined estimate 
of  the  evasion  (semi)  elasticity.  Moreover,  as  Fisman  and  Wei  (2004)  have  pointed  out  that  if  the 
government  tries  to  protect  tax  revenue  by  setting  tax  rates  systematically  in  inverse  proportion  to 
importer’s ability to evade them, then the estimated elasticity will be an underestimate implying a favorable 
direction of bias. 
 
4.  Data 
Our main sources of data are twofold. The data on imports by Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria as 
recorded by their respective authorities and exports as recorded by authorities in countries that export to 
Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria comes from UN COMTRADE data. These data are available as a time series 
at the HS-6 digit level for about 4,700 products for our case. We use the data for 2001 and 2004 to match 
the data for trade protection from MacMAP.   
We term the missing imports definition-match rate as the proportion of cases for any particular year 
for  which  the  data  on  exports  at  HS-6  digit  level  has  a  counterpart  entry  at  the  import  end.  The 
corresponding  extreme  smuggling-definition  match  rate  is  defined  as  the  proportion  of  cases  for  any 
particular year for which the data on exports at HS-6 digit level has a counterpart entry at the import end, 
plus the cases for which data on exports has no counterpart entry at the import end.  
Appendix Table 1 provides summary indicators of match rates for the three countries. These rates 
vary by partner, country and year. Overall the missing definition-match rate for the pooled sample is 35% 
for Kenya, 38% for Mauritius and 30% for Nigeria. The extreme smuggling-definition match rates are much 
bigger. In general, match rates are higher for the more advanced trading partners. In the empirical analysis, 
we do the analysis with all trading partners but also include the analysis restricting the sample to top 20 
trading partners and top 5 trading partners. The top 20 trading partners account for more than 90% of trade 
for Kenya and Mauritius and more than 88% for Nigeria. The extreme smuggling-definition match rate here 
is greater than 80%. The match rate changes marginally with the top 5 trading partners vis-a-vis the top 20 
trading partners.   
Unlike earlier studies, our measure of evasion is not averaged across partner countries since the 
variable of interest, Kenyan, Mauritian and Nigerian tariffs (Nigerian tariffs do not vary with time in our 
data), varies not only by product and time but also with partner countries. The sample that makes the  
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extreme smuggling assumption has more than 56,000 observations for Kenya and Nigeria and more than 
51,000 observations for Mauritius.  In the specification without the extreme smuggling assumption, the 
sample size reduces to about 24,000, 23,000 and 26,000 observations for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria 
respectively. Note that this size of sample is for the case where we include all the trading partners.   
Data on trade protection comes from MacMAP 2001 and MacMAP 2004. As discussed above, the 
import  duty  from  the  MAcMap  database  includes  all  preferential  schemes  and  regional  agreements 
prevailing in 2001 and 2004 and other measures of bilateral protection (specific tariffs, tariff rate quotas and 
anti-dumping  duties).  The  MAcMap  database  is  a  three-dimensional  database  that  gives  for  all  vectors 
(importer/exporter/product) ad valorem equivalent tariffs from information on either bound Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) regime, or Applied Most Favored Nation regime, or preferential regime granted by the 
importer to the exporter on this product.12 Tariff information is available at the HS6 level, for 163 importing 
countries, 208 exporting countries and 5,111 products.  
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the scatter plot of the applied tariffs for Mauritius, Kenya and Nigeria (at 
the product and trading partner level) for 2001 and 2004 data. At the product, trading partner level there is 
significantly greater variation between two time periods for Mauritius that we exploit in the estimations of 
equations 5 and 6. The corresponding variation for Kenya is smaller while there is almost no change in the 
Nigerian tariff between 2001 and 2004.   
 
Figure 1: Applied tariffs in Mauritius (2001 and 2004) 
 
 
                                                           
12 We do implement the specifications in equations 3-6 with alternate measures of protection such as specific tariffs and MFN 
tariffs. The results are qualitatively similar and are not reported here. Importantly, however the estimated elasticities are 




Figure 2: Applied tariffs in Kenya (2001 and 2004) 
 





Table 3 provides summary statistics for some of the variables  based on MacMap and COMTRADE  
dataset for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria (for the pooled sample of 2001 and 2004). The values for first 
definition of evasion are summarized in greater detail in table 4. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the sample 
  Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria 












Log value of exports  9.42  2.15  24926  9.19  2.11  38158  10.94  2.31  23075 
Log value of imports  9.25  1.92  24926  9.11  1.88  38158  10.73  2.16  23075 
Log quantity of exports  7.14  3.29  22766  6.99  3.05  35810  8.39  3.78  23075 
Log quantity of imports  6.99  3.33  22766  6.55  3.05  35810  9.68  2.65  23075 
Log value of exports –
complete smuggling 
9.42  2.15  41658  9.19  2.2  46902  9.93  2.54  53430 
Log value of imports – 
complete smuggling 
9.25  1.92  41658  9.29  1.90  46902  10.23  2.12  51394 
Evasion in value – complete 
smuggling 
0.23  6.80  41658  0.22  6.58  46902  1.85  7.55  67727 
Log quantity of exports – 
complete smuggling 
4.91  4.27  38840  6.99  3.01  45830  7.49  3.70  49848 
Log quantity of imports- 
complete smuggling 
5.13  4.15  38840  6.70  3.10  45830  9.23  2.62  51158 
Evasion in quantity – 
complete smuggling 
0.06  5.70  38840  0.22  5.21  45830  0.15  6.89  67727 
 
 
Table 3 shows that trade gap is generally higher with the definition of complete smuggling which is 
expected. Moreover, the variance is higher with the latter definition. The average evasion gap in value for 
the three countries is higher for differentiated products relative to non-differentiated products based on 
Rauch (1999) classification, (0.48, 0.36 and 0.27 respectively for differentiated products; 0.19, 0.16 and 0.20 
respectively for non-differentiated products in Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria). In quantity, it holds only for 
Kenya and Mauritius. 
In  absence  of  evasion,  trade  gap  is expected  to be negative since  imports  are reported in  cost 
insurance freight (cif) terms and exports are reported in free on board terms (fob). Table 4 shows that for 
both Kenya and Nigeria the average trade gap is positive. The biggest positive value for the trade gap is in 
case of Nigeria where the median trade gap is also positive. This provides some indication about evasion 
being more likely and significant in Nigeria vis-à-vis Kenya and Mauritius.    





Table 4: Trade gap (in value) and applied tariffs in Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria 
Kenya  
Applied tariffs  Evasion  
Mean  Median   Standard 
Deviation 
Observations  Mean  Median   Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
0.18  0.15  0.12  19,426  0.03  -0.04  1.83  19,426 
Mauritius   
Applied tariffs   Evasion 
0.23  0.15  0.27  18,211  -0.13  -0.11  1.80  18,211 
Nigeria 
Applied tariffs   Evasion 
0.24  0.2  0.20  11,586  0.23  0.29  2.24  11,586 
 
 
5.  Results  
Results from cross-sectional analysis  
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results from cross-sectional regression based on the first definition of 
evasion for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria (for evasion in value).  Tables A.2 presents the results from the 
evasion in value regression for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria using the second definition of evasion gap. In 
table A.3, the regression results for evasion in quantity are presented.  





Table 5: Cross-sectional results for evasion in value (Kenya) - All trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 














Differentiated dummy X tariff  -0.160*** 
(0.58) 
Differentiated dummy  0.14 
(0.29) 










Observations  11204  8222  19426  16603  16603 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.01 
 
Table 6: Cross-sectional regression for evasion in value (Mauritius) – All trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004  Pooled sample  Pooled sample  Pooled sample 














Differentiated X tariff interaction          -0.076 
(0.055) 
Differentiated dummy          0.027 
(0.131) 










Observations  10004  8207  18211  15764  15764 
R-squared  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.005 
 




Table 7: Cross-sectional regression for evasion in value (Nigeria) – All trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 














Differentiated dummy X tariff  -0.639 
(0.243) 
Differentiated dummy   0.167** 
(0.081) 










Observations  5428  6158  11586  9797  9797 
R-squared  0.013  0.020  0.016  0.018  0.018 
 
 
In tables 4,5 and 6, differentiated dummy in the regression equals 1 if the product is differentiated 
based on Rauch classification and equals 0 if the product is homogenous. Tariff on related products is the 
average tariff on products at the hs-4 digit level. Table 8, 9 and 10 present the same results for Kenya, 
Mauritius and Nigeria for the top 5 trading partners.
13 Note that these regressions need not involve the same 
set of products and/or trading partners. Based on the average of the two years 2001 and 2004, the top 5 
trading partners for Mauritius are China, France, Germany, India, and South Africa. In case of Kenya, the 
top 5 trading partners are China, India, South Africa, UK, and USA. In case of Nigeria these are China, 
Germany, Italy, UK, and USA. So the only country common among the top 5 trading partners for Kenya, 
Mauritius and Nigeria is China.  
Following the literature, we also run the specification with evasion in quantities Resulted reported in 
the appendix table A.3, like Javorcik and Narciso (2008) show that there is no consistent evidence for 
evasion in quantity being the channel for evasion for either of the three countries.  
   
                                                           




Table 8: Cross-sectional regression for evasion in value (Kenya) - Top 5 trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004  Pooled sample  Pooled sample  Pooled sample 















X tariff interaction  
        0.287 
(0.422) 
Differentiated dummy          -0.170 
(0.091) 










Observations  5282  5021  10303  9310  9310 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
Table 9: Cross-sectional regression for evasion in value (Mauritius)-Top 5 trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004  Pooled sample  Pooled sample  Pooled sample 














Differentiated X tariff interaction          -0.151 
(0.83) 
Differentiated dummy          0.036 
(0.075) 










Observations  5273  4118  9391  8507  8507 




Table 10: Cross-sectional regression for evasion in value (Nigeria)-Top 5 trading partners 
COEFFICIENT  2001  2004   Pooled sample  Pooled sample  Pooled sample 














Differentiated X tariff 
interaction 
        -1.135*** 
(0.390) 
Differentiated dummy           0.373*** 
(0.132) 










Observations  2035  2490  3981  4113  4113 
R-squared  0.115  0.032  0.042  0.023  0.023 
 
The columns in the tables 4-9 thus present results with increasing level of generality by adding 
controls. Moving across the columns, added controls are for effective incentives to evade taxes in terms of 
tariffs on related products and interaction of tariffs with dummies for differentiation, the variables which are 
expected to capture the incentive to misclassify and evade and the ease of evasion respectively.     
The results in tables 4-9 suggest that in Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria there is evidence for positive 
and significant elasticity of tariff evasion. The positive sign of the coefficient (and if it is significant) suggests 
that  greater  is  the  tariff  on  related  products,  greater  is  the  (semi)  elasticity  of  tariff  evasion.  If 
misclassification by listing the product as some other similar products is the channel to evade taxes then 
incentives  to  evade  taxes  is  lower  with  higher  tariffs  on  those  similar  or  related  products.  Unlike  the 
literature  we  do  not  find  robust  evidence  for  differentiated  goods  to  exhibit  greater  trade  gap.  One 
conjecture for this result is the measure of protection used. If for example more differentiated products 
have lower unaccounted for protection in other studies then the correlation between tariffs and evasion 
could be inflated for these products.  
Also,  if  differentiated  products  are  traded  more  with  certain  partners  and  if  trading  partner 
characteristics matter then one could find negative or insignificant effect of differentiation if more trade of 
differentiated products occurs with partners with better institutional quality. The central theme of Javorcik 
and Narciso (2008) that differentiated products have greater evasion could thus be context specific. The fact 
that Javorcik and Narciso (2008) consider trade only with one partner i.e. Germany is thus potentially 
important  for  their  results.  Mishra  et  al  (2008)  also  find  evidence  for  higher  evasion  in  differentiated 
products. Both these studies however use ad valorem tariffs only and thus use a restricted measure of 
protection that is narrow in breadth and also does not vary across trading partners.     
We also find that the results  evasion elasticity is sensitive to the exact measure of protection. Results 
reported in the appendix (Table A.4) show that the estimates are different if the only ad valorem tariffs are 
used compared to a case where applied tariffs are used. Similarly, it matters whether or not ad valorem 
equivalent  of  specific  tariffs  are  included  in  the  measure.  Thus  we  believe  that  the  breadth  of  trade 
protection measure used is an important consideration as existing estimates from several studies (based only 
on ad valorem tariffs) are potentially based on inadequately measured protection.  
Comparing the estimates for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria, the (semi) elasticity of evasion is higher 
for  Nigeria  relative  to  Kenya,  and  higher  for  Kenya  relative  to  Mauritius.  This  is  true  in  almost  all 
specifications, including the regressions restricted to the sample with top 5 trading partners. We will see later  
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that this ordering of the estimated (semi) elasticity holds in most cases even when focusing on the same set 
of products and identical set of trading partners for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria.  
Among the three countries, a study on tariff evasion exists only in case of Kenya which however is 
constrained by the use of a very small sample (the study by Levin and Widell (2007). Even though Kenya 
ranks low in the index of institutional quality, Levin and Widell (2007) argue that between 2001 and 2004, 
the overall bribery index declined in Kenya. The Kenyan tax authority was in fact ranked as one of the most 
improved organizations within the country in 2004. A simple test for the improvement in institutional 
quality during this time period would be a decline in tariff evasion after controlling for characteristics that 
determine enforceability. Our results indicate that this is hardly true and after controlling for incentives for 
evasion and potential for evasion in terms of differentiation in products or focusing on same set of products 
for the two time periods, the evasion elasticity in 2004 continues to be significant for Kenya and is as high 
(if not higher) as in 2001. 
Levin and Widell (2007) who assess the evasion elasticity for Kenya (in values) for imports coming 
in from Tanzania do not find significant evasion elasticity for Kenya after adding controls for tariffs on 
related products. The specification where Levin and Widell (2007) do find significant evasion elasticity, the 
estimate for 2004 is 1.8. Comparing to our estimates for 2004, the estimated elasticity is lower in our case. 
With the addition of controls, the highest estimate of elasticity is 1.4, still 0.4 points below the estimate in 
Levin and Windell (2007). However, like Levin and Widell (2007) we do find that evasion elasticity in Kenya 
has risen over time (but it continues to be as high). Looking at the restricted sample of Tanzania as exporter 
as Levin and Widell (2007) but using the MacMAP dataset for trade protection, we also find insignificant 
estimates of evasion elasticity (though still lower than Levin and Widell (2007). As in Levin and Windell 
(2007), the sample size is extremely small (only 72 data points).  
Levin and Widell (2007) also analyze evasion with respect to trade only with UK. To compare with 
Levin and Windell (2007), the estimated evasion elasticity for trade with UK is positive and insignificant (as 
in Levin and Widell 2007). Our evidence however is based on much larger sample and using a broader 
measure of protection from MacMAP (2001 and 2004). The results for the data on top 5 trading partners 
(table 5) however shows positive and significant elasticity of evasion in a sample that includes UK as well.   
The difference in our estimates with the existing estimate (for Kenya) can be explained based on 
several factors. First, our estimated elasticity comes from use of data for all trading partners or top 5 trading 
partners and not one country (Tanzania or UK) as in Levin and Widell (2007). The sample in Levin and 
Widell is extremely small with a maximum of 160 observations. Hence their estimates are likely to be highly 
imprecise.    In  this  paper,  the  estimated  elasticity  for  Kenya  is  the  average  across  all  trading  partners. 
Secondly, our trade protection measure is different from the ones used in Levin and Widell (2007). Most 
importantly, the estimated elasticity of evasion is obtained from a large sample (over 16,000 data points in 
the pooled sample). 
Further,  there  exist  point  estimates  for  different  countries  based  on  cross-sectional  regressions 
starting with the pioneering work by Fisman and Wei (2004). The point estimates for Tanzania in Levin and 
Widell (2007) are much higher at 3.8. Dunem and Arndt (2006) apply the cross-sectional methodology of 
Fisman and Wei (2004) to the imports of Mozambique from South Africa in year 2003. The estimated 
coefficient in their case is 1.4. Focusing on estimates for 2004 for Kenya in this paper, these estimates of 
elasticity for evasion in value for other African countries are generally higher except for Mozambique which 
is nearly identical. Similar point estimates exist for non-African countries, China and India from Fisman and 
Wei (2004) and Mishra et al (2008) respectively. Without adding any controls the point estimates are 2.7 and 
0.9 respectively in the two studies. In Javorcik and Narciso (2008), the estimate of evasion elasticity is for 
the sample pooling all countries. Hence country specific elasticities are not available.  
Interestingly, all these countries are ranked higher than Kenya and Nigeria and lower than Mauritius 
in the Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International. However, the caveat is that de facto 
institutional quality might require evasion elasticity to be estimated using datasets for same trading partners,  
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products  and  also  time  periods.  Without  focusing  on  same  set  of  products  and  trading  partners,  the 
comparison shows that the link between perceived institutional quality and observed tax evasion could be 
weak and not necessarily monotonic.  
The estimation of the (semi) elasticity of evasion (in this paper) above exploits only one source of 
variation to identify the effects of tariffs on evasion i.e. across products.  However, exploiting variation only 
across  products  has  some  limitations.  As  Mishra  et  al  (2008)  have  argued  if  tariffs  are  systematically 
correlated with some other aspect of the product (say ease of enforcement) that also affects evasion, then 
including the time variation can control for such product-specific characteristics. This can better isolate the 
impact of tariffs on evasion. Mishra et al (2008) motivate their analysis by exploiting the variation in tariffs 
within 6-digit products over time for India and deem it a very general and demanding specification. Similar 
identification strategy  not contain is across trading partners. In the next section we run specification that 
captures the variation across all three dimensions (for Kenya and Mauritius).  
 
Results from fixed effects regression 
Table 10 presents the results from regression on pooled sample for 2001 and 2004 respectively 
where for Kenya, trading partner and product fixed effects are added one by one in columns 2 and 3 
respectively. The column 4 adds all the fixed effects. Columns 5 onwards repeat the same exercise for 
Mauritius and Nigeria. Table A.5 provides the same results for evasion in quantity using the two definitions. 
 




Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria  




2.689**   
(1.090) 
0.527***       












-0.870                            
[0.858] 
-0.394**               











  -0.081 
(0.065) 
    0.149 
(0.116) 
Differentiated 





  0.043 
[0.183]          







Y   
Y 





Y  Y   
Y 





  Y   
Y 
  Y   
Y 
 
Observations  16604  19426    16603  15764  15764    15764  9797 
R-squared  0.27  0.27  0.29 
0.29 















Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria  
Applied tariff  2.467*** 
(0.511) 










5.217***                          
[0.508]     
Tariff on related 
products 
    -0.563      
 [1.950] 





             
Differentiated 
dummy X tariff  
  0.009 
(1.381) 
    0.294 
(1.088) 
   
Product fixed 
effect 
  Y  Y    Y  Y   
Trading partner 
fixed effect 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed 
effect  
  Y  Y    Y  Y   
Observations  42463  42463  32678  38768  38768  30725  27768 
R-squared  0.21  0.43  0.44  0.17  0.44  0.44  0.17 
Results in tables 11 and 12 show the importance of adding trading partner and product fixed effects. 
This can be gauged from the comparison with the cross-sectional regression. For example just adding the 
trading partner fixed effect changes the evasion elasticity in Kenya to move from 0.92 to 1.19, in Mauritius 
from 0.19 to 0.52 and in Nigeria from 1.40 to 1.76. There are several ways in which for the same products 
and at the same time, evasion could be related to who the trading partner is. For example, it could be 
correlated with mode of transport. Mishra et al (2008) for example find that evasion differs based on mode 
of entry (by air or by sea). Else, evasion technology which is largely unknown can be conjectured to require 
inputs from both exporter and importer.  For example, exporters and importers could collude with an 
implicit  or  explicit  side  payment  to  foster  evasion.  Similarly,  historical  reputation  of  trade  with  some 
particular trading partners often determines the bias of inspectors and could ease or tighten enforcement.  
All these possibilities are likely to be correlated with characteristics of the trading partner, for example 
unobserved institutional quality.  
  The results from the fixed effects estimation provide strong evidence for evasion elasticity to be 
significant in these countries. In case of Mauritius, the evasion elasticity is significantly lower and after 
controlling for product and trading partner unobserved characteristics, the evasion elasticity is no longer 
significant but in case of second definition. Comparing with the addition of only the trading partner fixed 
effects, the evasion elasticity for Nigeria is greater compared to Kenya and Mauritius.  
Similarly addition of product fixed effects also changes the coefficient significantly in all three cases. 
In Kenya, just addition of product fixed effects nearly doubles the estimate from pooled sample cross-
sectional regression for both evasion in value and evasion in quantity (in case of first definition). This 
contrasts with Mishra et al (2008) where addition of the product fixed effects actually reduces the coefficient 
of  elasticity  of  evasion.  Nevertheless  point  remains  that  as  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  changes 
significantly,  there  is  a  systematic  correlation  between  our  trade  protection  measures  and  product 
characteristics relevant for evasion. One of the characteristics i.e. whether or not good is differentiated, we 
control  for  in  the  specifications  above.  However,  several  other  product  characteristics,  observed  and 
unobserved could  correlate  with  product specific amenability  to evasion  and  therefore  bias  the  results.   
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Hence, the estimation of evasion elasticity that exploits only the product level variation as in several studies 
discussed above potentially leads to inconsistent estimates.   
 
6.  Common set of products and trading partners  
The  comparison  between  Kenya,  Mauritius  and  Nigeria  as  discussed  above  does  not  put  any 
restriction on the set of trading partners or imported products.  The analysis above shows that both the 
products on which as well as the trading partners with which evasion is considered matters.  Hence,  a more 
meaningful comparison of tariff evasion between Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria would be by restricting the 
sample to same set of traded products and trading partners. There are three ways in which we restrict 
samples for comparison. First we restrict the sample for all three countries to include the same set of traded 
products. Next we restrict it to contain the same set of trading partners. Finally, the samples are restricted to 
contain the same set of trading partners as well as products i.e. the sample includes same products traded 
with the same partner for the three countries. Below we conduct the same analysis as above but imposing 
these restrictions.  
Table 13 presents the results from cross-sectional regression with the last of these  restrictions. The 
ordering  of  results  is  identical  in  case  of  common  products  and  common  partners  and  has  not  been 
reported  below.  In case of  regression  on  a sample with  perfectly matched trade  but using  the  second 
definition, the coefficients or Kenya and Nigeria are significant at 1% level and estimated to be 3.14 and 
6.023 respectively. The coefficient on Mauritius is insignificant and estimated to equal 0.15.  (these estimates 
compare to the ones in columns J,K and L in table 13 below that is for first definition).     
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Table 13: Cross-sectional regression Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria (Perfectly matched trade) – First definition of evasion ( 
Same product, same trading partner) 
 
 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L 















0.891***                          
[0.246] 




0.667**                          
[0.336] 
0.250*                           
[0.131] 


















            0.718                             
[0.557] 
-0.019                            
[0.237] 
-0.148                             
[0.383] 
     
Differentiated 
dummy 
            -0.213*                           
[0.127] 
-0.078                             
[0.104] 
0.049                            
[0.131] 




N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  3942  3942  3942  3581  3590  3600  3942  3942  3942  3942  3942  3942 
R-squared  0.005  0.001  0.017  0.006  0.002  0.018  0.006  0.002  0.018  0.041  0.040  0.042 
 
These results show that even after restricting ourselves to sample that is directly comparable across 
the three countries, we find consistent evidence for the evasion elasticity to be significantly higher in Nigeria 
vis-à-vis Kenya, and in Kenya vis-à-vis Mauritius. In such a restricted sample that imposes the restriction of 
matched trade, comparison is most meaningful as difference in estimates is not driven by differences in 
product or trading partner characteristics but by countries’ levels of trade protection and their efficiency in 
enforcement.    
 
7.  Robustness Checks and Limitations 
7.1  Robustness checks  
The  analysis  above  provides  consistent  evidence  of  evasion  in  value  being  positively  and  significantly 
correlated with level of tariffs in Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria (particularly for first definition of evasion). 
We however do not find similar consistent evidence on the relationship between evasion in quantity and 
level of tariffs. Though there is some evidence for evasion in quantity also being positively and significantly 
correlated with level of tariffs, such a relationship holds for Nigeria with robustness while in case of Kenya 
and Mauritius it holds only in some specifications. Where there is lack of evidence on correlation between 
evasion in quantity and the level of tariffs it suggests that undercounting of quantities is less likely to be the 
channel of evasion.  
  In this section we present results of several robustness checks for the two results mentioned above.  
First, we want to check the robustness of evidence for semi elasticity of tariff evasion being positive and 
statistically significant in the three countries. Second we want to test for robustness of ranking of evasion 
vis-à-vis the order of perceived institutional quality. 
  There are potential biases possible in the results obtained in this paper. The first relates to the issue 
of endogeneity. Is it possible that tariffs are set minutely enough (at the trading partner and product level at 
a given point in time) in response to evasion in that particular category that could lead to endogeneity. This 
question is likely to be less pertinent for case of Kenya and Mauritius where identification in the most 
general specification comes from within product and trading partner changes over time (discussed above). 
In case of Nigeria since the only fixed effect we are able to control for is trading partner fixed effect,  
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endogeneity is more of a concern. Below we present results from two regressions using the instrumental 
variable strategy to control for potential endogeniety bias. Given the limited data we have the instrumental 
variable  regressions  are  not  very  useful  for  assessing  the  direction  of  the  bias  (in  relation  to  the 
uninstrumented regressions above). This is because in case of both instrumental variable regressions, the 
data is essentially different from the regressions implemented above without instrumenting.  
7.1.1   Results from instrumental variable regressions. 
We implemented two instrumental variable regressions. In the first case we used the cross-sectional data for 
2004 for Kenya and Mauritius and in the regression used lagged tariff i.e. tariff for 2001 as an instrument. 
Same instrumental variable (i.e. lagged tariffs) has been used by Javorcik and Narciso (2008). Note that given 
our data set such an instrumenting cannot work for Nigeria where the tariffs in 2001 and 2004 are nearly 
similar. Table 14 presents the results for regression on 2004 data using tariffs in 2001 as instrument for the 
case of Kenya and Mauritius (using the first definition).  
 
Table 14: Instrumental variable regression of evasion in value on tariffs (lagged tariff as instrument) 
VARIABLES  Evasion in value 
2004 (Kenya) 
First stage – applied tariff 
in 2004 (Kenya) 
Evasion in value 2004 
(Mauritius) 
First stage -applied tariff in 
2004 (Mauritius) 




















9927  9651  9821  9751 
R-squared   0.003  0.70  0.001  0.78 
 
  We implemented another instrumental variable regression where applied tariffs was instrumented 
with bound tariffs. The drawback for this instrument is that it is available for very few commodities (in 
developing countries – please see the discussion above for the number of tariff lines that are bound) and 
even though it has high correlation with applied tariffs it is most closely related with MFN tariffs. Given the 
scarcity of data we implemented the regression for the case using second definition of evasion. The results 
are presented in table 15 below. 




Table 15: Instrumental variable regression for evasion in value (second definition) on tariffs (Bound tariffs as instrument) 
  Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria 












Observations  1456  1814  640 
R-squared  0.018  0.015  0.027 
     
7.1.2  Further accounting for product types  
There are two types of distinction amongst product that could make them more or less amenable to evasion. 
First, there could be distinction across capital and consumer goods that is likely to result in different evasion 
possibilities. This could be owing to several reasons such as mode of transport or the simple difference in 
bulkiness.  To  the  extent  that  the  level  of  differentiation  varies    across  the  two  sets  of  products,  it  is 
accounted for in the specifications considered above. Secondly, the nature and extent of protection could 
differ across consumer and capital goods. It is common that countries tend to protect their consumer goods 
sector  more  especially  during  initial  periods  of  liberalization  vis-à-vis  the  capital  goods  sector.  Hence, 
particularly  when  comparing  across  countries,  the  nature  of  products  traded  could  be  important.  The 
classification  into  basic,  capital  and  intermediate  good  and  consumer  good  (durables  and  non-
durables)comes from Nouroz (2001). The results are presented in table 15 below. For Kenya and Mauritius 
the specification includes time, product and trading partner fixed effects along with interaction of tariffs 
with consumer good dummy that equals 1 if it is consumer durable or consumer non-durable. The ordering 
of  the  magnitudes  is  as  before  with  Mauritius  having  the  least  elasticity  followed  by  Kenya  (in  the 
specification that is comparable).   
Similarly,  it  is  worthwhile  to  distinguish  between  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  imports.  The 
former is prone to be subjected to different types of non-tariff barriers and are more homogenous relative 
to non-agricultural goods (Javorcik and Narciso 2008). Table 16 below presents results of regressions on a 
sample that does not contain agricultural goods. 
   
Table 16: Effect of applied tariffs on evasion – Accounting for consumer good and capital/basic/intermediate good distinction 
  Kenya   Mauritius  Nigeria  
Applied tariff                  0.671***       





Consumer good dummy   0.064  
[0.052]                      





consumer good dummy  x applied tariffs          0.395*  
[0.228]                 





N  16682             15353  10064 




Table  17  shows  that  restricting  to  non-agricultural  imports  also  the  evasion  (semi)  elasticity  is 
highest in Nigeria followed by Kenya.  
 
Table 17: Effect of applied tariffs on evasion: Limiting to non-agricultural goods 




evasion_val (non agriculture 
Nigeria  c1) 
       












Observations  18638  16453  10724 
R-squared  0.005  0.001  0.017 
     
7.1.3  Testing for equality of coefficient in a pooled regression (across three countries) 
Our interest in this paper is on relative ordering of evasion elasticity across the three countries. One simple 
test whether the countries have similar elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs (in a statistical sense) is by 
implementing the model under two different assumptions (i) Allowing coefficients to differ across the three 
countries and (ii) Restricting the coefficients to be the same across the three countries. In an augmented 
regression as expressed in equation 7, simple t tests on some coefficients could provide evidence whether or 
not the coefficients are statistically different from each other. 
            =∝ +     ∗            +    +    +    ∗        ∗    +      ∗        ∗     +∈         
 (7) 
In equation 7,    and    are dummies that equal 1 if country is Nigeria and Mauritius respectively. The 
excluded category in the country dummy is Kenya. The t tests on coefficients   and     determine whether 
the tariff coefficients in each of the two countries are individually different from the excluded category i.e. 
Kenya. The regression results are presented in table 18 below. Results show that as the interaction term of 
tariffs with both Nigeria and Mauritius dummy is highly significant (at 1% level), the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are equal across the three countries is rejected. Also the hypotheses that   < 0 and   > 0 is not 
rejected at least at 5% level of significance. Together these provide some evidence of evasion elasticity to 
vary across these countries with Mauritius having the least elasticity of evasion with respect to applied 
tariffs.  
Table 18: Regression on pooled sample: Testing for equality of coefficients 
    Coefficient (standard error) 
Applied tariff  0.92***(0.10) 
Applied tariff *Nigeria dummy  0.47***(0.14)      
Applied tariff * Mauritius dummy  -0.73***(0.11)     
Mauritius dummy  -0.04(0.02)     
Nigeria dummy  0.01(0.03)      
Constant   -0.133***(0.02)     
R squared   0.01 




7.1.4  Non-parametric and semi-parametric regression to allow for non-linearity in the effect of applied 
tariffs on evasion 
Until now we have allowed applied tariffs to affect evasion linearly. In general we obtained significant 
effects of applied tariffs on evasion in value for the three countries (the exception being Mauritius in some  
specifications i.e. with second definition). In this section we allow for tariffs to enter non-linearly in evasion 
equation. In particular we implement a fully non-parametric regression and a semi-parametric version of 
equation (3) where applied tariff is made to enter non-parametrically.  The semi parametric specification is 
specified as in equation 8 below.     
    
  =  1,2              =   ∝ +    (          ) +    ∗               +    ∗    +          (8) 
In equation (8) above, in technical terms it is assumed that the conditional mean of evasion in value 
has a linear parametric component (depending on the tariffs on similar products and differentiated dummy) 
and a non-parametric component (i.e. the applied tariffs). The requirements on function   are standard as in 
non-parametric regressions i.e. it is smooth, single valued and has a bounded first derivative. We estimate 
the partial linear model in equation 8 by Robinson (1998) method. 
Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 (in the appendix) show the non-parametric local polynomial smoothing 
based mean regression with their confidence bands (the rule of thumb bandwidths have been used) for 
Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria respectively. The plots show some evidence for non-linearity but in most 
ranges an upward sloping relationship. Further, the confidence bands show that the relationship is tighter 
for Kenya and Nigeria vis-à-vis Mauritius.  
The linear regressions are a special case of this non-parametric regression where a sufficiently high 
bandwidth will result in a linear relationship. In the tails as the density is low the confidence bands are wider. 
The marginal effects from simple non-parametric regressions have not been presented which are similar to 
the  ones  from  semi  parametric  regressions  that  are  plotted  below.  The  results  for  semi  parametric 
regressions are presented in table 19 below. 
 
Table 19: Results of semi-parametric regression of evasion in value (first definition) on applied tariffs 
  Kenya   Mauritius  Nigeria  
Kenya  Coefficient   Value of test 
statistic 
P value   Coefficient   Value of 
test 
statistic 











0.10  0.06  0.95  -2.63*** 
 
-3.48  0.00  -4.99**  -2.42  0.01 
Significance 
test on applied 
tariff :  
  13.256***  0.00    13.12***  0.00    10.60***  0.00 
Number of 
observations  
16602      15627      9796     
 
Results show that allowing for non-linear specification of applied tariff, the significance test of the applied 
tariffs (ut_uv) that enters the specification non-linearly indicates that applied tariffs is highly significant for 
evasion in all three countries (P-value of 0.000).  
  In comparing the effect of level of tariffs on evasion we computed the marginal effects of the tariffs 
on evasion at different levels of tariffs and constructed confidence intervals (95%) around each marginal 
effect. With non-parametric regression, the effect of tariffs on evasion varies locally. The marginal effects 
for the non-linear part can be calculated as:    =
  
   where    is the change in the dependent variable  
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from one observation in the sample to the next, and    is the change in value of the nonlinear function. 
The  marginal  effect  of  a  particular  level  of  tariff  is  averaged  across  products  and  trading  partners. 
Comprising several local regressions, the marginal effects vary from one point to the other. The test of 
significance is then implemented at different points along the curve where the standard errors are obtained 
from bootstrapping.    
  Figures 4, 5 and 6 plot the significant marginal effects against tariffs in the case of three countries 
from the semi parametric regression in equation (8). As marginal effects vary across level of tariffs and the 
number of points for which statistical significance is obtained also vary in the three countries it is difficult to 
compare the strength of effect of tariffs on evasion per se. However, suggestive evidence can be obtained 
from the distribution of marginal effects; if skewed towards higher numbers suggest a greater effect of 
tariffs on evasion. As figures 4,5 and 6 show that where the marginal effects are positive the values in 
Nigeria are the highest (the highest being nearly 7 in Nigeria). Relatively smaller positive values of marginal 
effects are in case of Kenya and smallest in case of Mauritius.  
 
































Figure 5: Marginal effect of tariffs on evasion (Mauritius) 
 
 
Figure 6: Marginal effect of tariffs on evasion –(Nigeria) 
 
 
 7.2  Limitations of the study 
The most important strength of the data set used in this paper is that it offers the most comprehensive 
measure  of  protection  (from  MacMAP)  vis-à-vis  the  ones  used  in  all  other  papers  on  tariff  evasion. 
However, this dataset is available for only two years which depending on the case does or does not have 
over time variation. This constrains the methods used for estimating evasion (semi) elasticity as in case of 
Nigeria.  Also, the analysis focusing on two years though provides strong evidence of an objective measure 
of specific institutional quality viz. the customs authority, it needs to be updated with more long term data 
as institutions do evolve slowly over time. Similarly, to conclude about a general relationship between tariff 
evasion and institutional quality, a comprehensive list of countries should be tested for such an ordered 






























































In the analysis above, there is one reason to believe that our estimate of the evasion elasticity might 
be biased downward. Recall that the policy measure that we use is applied tariffs. Though the measure of 
applied tariffs (from MacMAP) is extensive and incorporates several instruments of trade protection, yet 
one important measure that could be missing in the analysis is the quantitative restriction. It is not clear how 
extensive are these measures and there do not exist good product level measures of quantitative measures of 
such restrictions.  Note that the three countries are members of WTO and therefore several quantitative 
restrictions would have been reduced over time.   
Another limitation of the study could come from our inability to account for transport costs at the 
disaggregated level of products. As discussed above since imports are reported as cif and exports as fob 
transport cost differences could affect the size of trade gap across countries. This concern is mitigated to 
some extent by the fact that none of these countries are landlocked. Further in terms of average distance 
from  its  trading  partners,  Mauritius  is  the  farthest  among  the  three  countries  (computed  for  top  20 
partners). Indeed issues relating to infrastructure and input costs (oil price in case of Nigeria) also remain 
and can result in different cif values for a given fob value of exports. 
 
8.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we use the case of Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria to examine the effect of tariff policies 
on evasion.  The analysis was motivated by the relative ordering of these three African countries in terms of 
their perceived institutional quality and the fact that in these countries tariff revenues constitute a very 
important component of the government budget. The methodological contribution of the paper has been to 
better identify the effect of tariffs on evasion using the variations in trade protection measures across three 
dimensions (time, product and trading partner). We also find evidence for effect of enforcement-related 
factors on evasion elasticity mainly in terms of level of protection on similar products being important.  
Numerous robustness checks have been carried out and support our main conclusions. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a significant and robust impact of tariffs on evasion 
(semi-elasticity) in values for Kenya and Nigeria in different specifications.  The result on Mauritius provides 
weaker evidence for the relationship between evasion and trade protection.  The evidence is weaker as in an 
alternate measure of evasion we do not find statistically significant effect of tariffs on evasion in Mauritius. 
For all the three countries there is no robust evidence for evasion in quantity being significantly related to 
level of tariffs. The data supports the hypothesis of significant evasion (semi) elasticity in quantities for 
Kenya and Nigeria only in case of complete smuggling assumption for missing trade.  
Further, the ranking of estimated evasion elasticity (for value) actually matches the ranking of these 
countries in terms of institutional quality. Given our emphasis on trading partner and product characteristics 
it is particularly important that this ordering is preserved in case of perfectly matched trade. Yet, one needs 
to be cautious in pre-supposing a monotonic relationship between evasion and institutional quality. The 
aggregative nature of the institutional quality indices implies that this mapping may be far from perfect. 
Hence, the Kenya bribery index seems to have improved over time but the estimate of evasion elasticity also 
seems to have risen between 2001 and 2004. 
What the results here suggest that evasion gap is positively correlated with trade protection measure 
especially in case of Kenya and Nigeria. Thus, evasion gap can potentially be reduced through trade reform. 
Importantly, it is possible that trade reform can lead to higher and not necessarily lower tax revenues. This is 
all the more important as this element has been and is still used as a main deterrent to important tariff and 
trade reforms. 
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Appendix: 
Table A.1: Match rates for Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria for the pooled 2001 and 2004 sample 
Coverage   Assumption about missing imports   Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria 
Full sample   Missing   33%  38%  30% 
Top 20 trading partners   Missing   43%  42% 
 
39% 
Top 5 Trading Partners   Missing   50%  52%  48% 
Full sample   Extreme smuggling   80%  83%  83% 
Top 20 trading partners   Extreme smuggling  83%  84%  84% 
Top 5 Trading Partners   Extreme smuggling  84%  85%  85% 
 
Table A.2: Cross-sectional results on evasion in value using the second definition of evasion gap   
COEFFICIENT  Kenya (Pooled sample)  Mauritius (Pooled sample)  Nigeria (Pooled Sample) 












Differentiated dummy   -0.520*** 











R-squared  0.01  0.001  0.05 
Observations  32678  30601  20829 
 




Table A.3: Cross-sectional results on evasion in quantity  
  Kenya (Pooled 
sample) 
  Mauritius 
(Pooled 
sample) 




COEFFICIENT  First definition 
of evasion gap 
Second 
definition of 
evasion gap  
First definition 
















































[0.382]   
Differentiated 
dummy X tariff   
0.125  
 (0.484) 










Observations  15053  32563  14675  30601  9000  20829 




Table A.4: Evasion with respect to MFN tariffs and applied tariffs in Kenya and Mauritius 
COEFFICIENT  evasion_val (Kenya)  evasion_val (Kenya)  evasion_val (Mauritius)  evasion_val (Mauritius) 
applied tariff  0.927***    0.193***   
  (0.10)    (0.049)   
mfn tariff    0.787***    0.150*** 
    (0.12)    (0.047) 
Constant  -0.134***  -0.171***  -0.179***  -0.172*** 
  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Observations  19426  11204  18211  18211 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
Table A.5: Fixed effects regression for evasion in quantity in Kenya, Mauritius and Nigeria (All trading partners – first 
definition – first three columns, second definition –last three columns)  
COEFFICIENT  Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria  Kenya  Mauritius  Nigeria 
Applied tariff  0.306 
[0.506] 
0.334 




[0.822]    
0.404  
[0.342]   
7.273***  
(1.215) 
Tariff on related products  -0.846   
[0.515] 
-0.845*** 

































Trading partner fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  15054  14675  9000  32563  30602  20829 




Figure A.1: Local Polynomial smoothed regression – Kenya (c1) 
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